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« WE CAN'T BE ANTISEMITIC, WE ARE ALL FRENCH: HISTORY, LEGACY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FRENCH MODEL OF INTEGRATION »

As the CRIF (Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France) pointed out in 2003, “Jews in France are generally well respected, socially assimilated and well represented in politics”¹. The same year, the CRIF commemorated the 60th anniversary of its creation in 1943 under German occupation. On this occasion, the CRIF organized a symposium, "Long Live The Republic!" and was invited to the Elysée by French President Jacques Chirac. French Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, was awarded the 2003 Tolerance Prize of the Simon Wiesenthal Center for his action against anti-Semitism (his “zero tolerance” policy)². President Chirac made a public statement in November. He declared: “on behalf of the nation, I solemnly condemn all acts of anti-Semitism, all acts that are not in accordance with the natural demands of the Republic. Indeed, acts of anti-Semitism are attacks on the fundamental rights of each citizen (...) When a Jew is attacked in France, it is an attack against the whole of France”.

President Chirac was then referring to the upsurge of anti-Semitic criminal offenses and verbal assault against Jewish citizens and institutions. Such attacks had been relatively limited prior to 2000, with the notable exception of the attack on the Jewish cemetery at Carpentras. This upsurge in anti-Semitic incidents since 2000 is therefore raising three major questions.

¹ CRIF, « Dossier : le rapport non publié sur l'antisémitisme en Europe », www.crif.org/dossiers, December 1, 2003.

² Sarkozy, « Confronted with anti-Semitism and racism, I know only two words : zero tolerance », Communiqué from the Presidential Palace, November 17, 2003

First, has France once again become an anti-Semitic country? Anti-Semitism has a long history in France, a long standing presence in French political culture. The extreme right wing movements neither monopolized anti-Semitic feelings nor propaganda (annex 1). Nevertheless, the current situation is difficult to decipher because of the contrast between the multiplication of incidents on the one hand, and the decrease of anti-Semitic feelings on the other hand. Recent polls confirmed that the French are not anti-Semitic. 87% of young people consider anti-Semitic acts disgraceful (UEJF, poll 2000). 85% of the French said they are sympathetic to the Jews in 2003 (compared with 72% in 1990 – CSA, *Le Figaro*, 2003). The SOFRES survey in 2002 (400 people aged between 15 and 24) revealed that 88% of the respondents considered that “the Jews should be allowed to follow their usual customs without risking to get into a fight” and 99% said “defacing synagogues is very serious”. The decline of intolerance toward the Jews, including among the youth of North African origin, is however partially contradicted by the fact that anti-Semitic violence constituted 80% of all incidents of hate crimes recorded in 2000 (45% in 2001 and 62% in 2002). The coexistence between these two parallel and contrasting phenomena illustrates the specificity of the French case and leads to the second question recently upgraded to the top of both the academic and political agendas.

Secondly, is the “new” anti-Semitism really new? According to the CNCDDH, the percentage attributable to the extreme-right was only 9% in 2002 (against 68% in 1994 and 14% in 2001). Does the “novelty” of the new Judeophobia reside in the identity of the perpetrators of anti-Semitic violence? Shmuel Trigano, for instance, wrote that “suburb anti-Semitism had revealed that the victims of racism (Arab Muslims) could be anti-Semites”³. Does the “novelty” of the current situation also reside in the alliance between radical Islamic activists, the heirs of “third worldism” and far left anti-globalization activists? Or, it is the link to the situation in the Middle East that constitutes the new key ingredient? All these questions are difficult to address. Anti-Semitic prejudices were already virulent during the Six Day War and the anti-Zionist campaign of the 1970’ and 1980’s. There were many examples of collusion between neo-nazi Skins and pro Arab activists long before 2000 (for instance, the firebombing of *La tribune Juive* in December, 1996). Thus, the main challenge is to explain why anti-Semitic tendencies flourish at a given time, yet flounder at another.

The third question is related to the coexistence between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and deals with the very nature of the French model of integration. The most common explanation of the fact that anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish acts in

³ Shmuel Trigano, *Actualités Juives*, April 25, 2002

France are presently committed mainly by youngsters from North African immigration is the claim that a form of anti-Semitism rooted in urban decay and social deprivations has superseded a far right anti-Semitism. As the police authorities concluded in 2003, the perpetrators are “predominantly delinquents without ideology, motivated by a diffuse hostility to Israel, exacerbated by the media representation of the Middle East conflict (...) a conflict which, they see, reproduces the picture of exclusion and failure of which they feel victims in France”. In other words, the victims of the failure of integration are discriminated against and, in turn, discriminate the Jews.

In this paper, I argue that the persistence of anti-Semitism in France reflects a double failure of the French model of integration. My argument is illustrated by three statements:

- “Everything must be refused to the Jews as a nation and everything granted to the Jews as individuals” (Count de Clermont Tonnerre, during the debate about the emancipation in 1791)
- “The terrorist attack on the Copernic Synagogue injured foreigners, and innocent French citizens” (R.Barre, 1980) – Three of the four victims were not Jewish
- “To harm the Jewish community is to harm France, harm the values of our republic” (J.P Raffarin) – in July 2002, at a meeting held on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the roundup of French Jews for deportation

In invoking the term “double failure”, I want to focus on two dimensions. First, the Jews were among the first to engage with the republican conception of integration. The emancipation of the Jewish “community” laid down the fundamental principle of the republican model (as illustrated by Clermont Tonnerre’s statement in 1791) – an “ethnic blind” model with no room for “community” or any collective identity. Thus, the Jews were the first to encounter both the limitations and ambiguities of this model.

Second, as illustrated by the second and third statements, the Jews are still perceived as being part of a “community” – which is a paradoxical posture; a “community” alternatively excluded (Barre) or included (Raffarin) in French society. Long before the emergence of an “immigration issue” in France, the Jews therefore faced the choice between assimilationist and particularistic strategies (“the right to be the same” and “the right to be different”). They also faced the absence of any choice when they were discriminated against, or persecuted. In other words, the limitations of the Republican model have historically been highlighted by the vicissitudes of Jewish assimilation/integration. While the persistence of anti-Semitism challenges the core of the Republican model, new limitations undermine its sustainability with

the “boomerang impact” of the failed integration of second and third generation members.

In this paper I will therefore seek to present and analyze the similarities between the “emancipation” of the French Jews and the “integration” of present migrant communities – the two processes being parallel and yet, paradoxically contrasting. In the first part, I analyze how the Jews were viewed, since 1791, as insiders and outsiders as well as both individuals and members of a specific community. In the second part, I focus on the different strategies adopted by the Jews historically when facing the ambivalence of the Republican model. Subsequently, I will draw a contemporary parallel by demonstrating how both the persistence of anti-Semitism and the growth of Islamophobia challenge the sustainability of this model.

1. The foundation of the Republican model around the question of Jewish emancipation: the “insider/outsider” ambivalence

In August 1789, the National Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens – which is still the cornerstone of the Republican model of integration. The Declaration recognized that “men are born equal and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be based only on common utility (..) No one should be disturbed for his opinions, even in religion, provided that their manifestation does not trouble public order as established by law”. The National Assembly, however, did not grant civil rights to French Jews until September 1791. The Assembly’s refusal to grant rights to the Jews clearly laid out in the words of the Declaration highlights the ambivalence of the Republican model since its birth: men are equal in rights but some men are more equal than others.

The debate about Jewish emancipation raised two questions: Are the Jews to be considered as individuals of a different religion or as foreign nationals living in France? Do the requirements of the Jewish religion allow its adherents to fulfill the requirements of citizenship, or do the religious restrictions prevent them from full participation?⁴ Obviously, these questions find resonance with the current debate about Islam in France or Islam of France.

What were the main arguments used and the different options envisaged? One position was articulated by Clermont Tonnerre who favored the emancipation of the Jews as individuals while encouraging them to assimilate into the majority. Like the German philosopher Wilhelm von Dohm (who published an influential book, entitled *Concerning the Amelioration of the Civil*

⁴ See Sharon Goldberg, « The Emancipation of the Jews of France », June 2002

Status of the Jews, 1781), he assumed that the opportunity to enjoy civil parity would fasten and secure this assimilation. Unlike Dohm who allowed for a large religious and cultural autonomy, Clermont Tonnerre even suggested that those Jews who did not wish to become citizens should be banished.

In contrast to Clermont Tonnerre, the Abbé Maury thought that Jews should be conceived of as a community, and that they should not be discriminated against on the basis of their religious beliefs. The Jews were a nation apart, with no interest in citizenship, whom France owed hospitality and protection but not citizenship. More radically, Voltaire agreed that the Jews were a separate nation but stated that the Jewish religion contributed to their moral degradation. While the Jews should be tolerated, they could not be improved by emancipation. The Abbé Gregoire, a champion of Jewish emancipation, opposed this view, believing that emancipation would improve the morality of the Jews – even to the point that they might convert to Christianity.

Opinions also differed about the ability of Jews to fulfill the requirements of citizenship. Some influential participants to the debate estimated that specific religious requirements would negate the utility of emancipation (Michaelis, Abbé Maury for instance). Others, however, believed that these requirements would gradually fall away as the Jews gained civic freedom (Mendelssohn, the Abbé Grégoire, Clermont Tonnerre).

Emancipation was finally granted, first to Sephardic Jews in January 1790 and then to Ashkenazy Jews in September 1791. The Clermont Tonnerre's option thus prevailed. But because the Jews were granted civil rights as individuals, they had to give up their communal autonomy and to dissolve into the majority. Assimilation was not defined; it was simply assumed that the Jews would adjust in exchange for their civil rights.

The emancipators, however, never really defined the standards to which they expected the Jews to accord and ambivalence prevailed. Thus, the Jews were granted the “right to be the same”, yet were designated specific duties in order to prove their loyalty to France. This legacy of the emancipation was subsequently manifest in the hesitation of French Jews to speak out against anti-Semitism during the Dreyfus case or before and after WWII.

Emancipation thus inaugurated a “differential integration” process. The process revealed the tensions between universalism and particularism that undermine the Republican model. It generated a question; once a group is emancipated, do its members enter French society as individuals, as a new version of their group, or as a combination of both?

2. The ambivalence of the republican model had always produced some degree of communitarization

The persistence of anti-Semitism in France after Emancipation proves that prejudice could not be remedied solely by supplying rights. Furthermore, equality before the law in principle was not applied in practice on a communal basis in France: French Jews were considered equals as individuals but the Jewish community was the target of specific, discriminatory regulations on a collective basis.⁵ Jews, for example, – unlike Christian French citizens – remained responsible for the debts of the *communautés* to which they (or their ancestors) had belonged before the Revolution. In their petitions and legal briefs, Jewish leaders argued that if Jews were to be considered as French citizens, they should not be considered as “Jews” before the law. The National Assembly had refused the rights of Jews to retain their communal institutions but obliged them to remain organized as a “community” to collect money to repay the debts.

In addition to this issue of communal debts, there was the issue of the religious taxes. Jews were allocated a sort of corporate identity in matters relating to taxation because, until 1830, religious expenses were funded by a special “Jewish tax” (which Christians did not have to pay). As the Central Consistory pointed out, “Frenchmen are Protestant, Catholic or Jewish before God. But they are Frenchmen before the law. The law can’t oblige certain Frenchmen to pay a religious tax”.

A third example of this differential treatment was the “Infamous Decree” issued by Napoleon in 1808 forbidding the Jews of Eastern France to borrow or lend money (the ban remained in effect until 1818). The Vichy regime was therefore not the only time in French history when unequal treatment was applied.

The insecurity fueled by anti-Semitism and the ambivalence of their civil status forced the Jews to adopt two different strategies, both based on the notion of “community”. Facing racial/religious and legal discrimination, and trying to redefine the relationship between their Jewishness and their Frenchness, Jewish leaders and intellectuals revitalized two notions: solidarity and racial identity.

⁵ See Lisa Moses Leff, « Jewish Solidarity in Nineteenth Century France : The Evolution of a Concept », *The Journal of Modern History*, 74, March 2002, p.33-61

Racial identity⁶

It is often assumed that Jewish racial identity was an invention of anti-Semites in the 1880's. In fact, Jewish publicists adopted this concept as part of a strategy of self-defense against anti-Semitism and as a way to explain their continued distinctiveness. Jewish leaders responded with concern about sustaining the rights granted to them by the emancipation after the July Monarchy proclaimed that Catholicism was the "religion of the majority of Frenchmen". They worried both during and after the revolution of 1848 when Catholic rhetoric grew stronger on the left within socialist and republican circles (with the Fourierists - Pierre Leroux or Victor Considérant, the revolutionaries Lamartine or de Laménais). Their anxiety deepened during the 1850's when socialists like Toussenel expressed anti-Jewish feelings and when Louis Napoleon granted the Catholic Church a greater place in public life (one major concern was the Falloux Law of 1850 which permitted the Church to establish primary, secondary and university level schools).

Race thus provided a useful framework and was a very popular concept. This variant had nothing to do with the racialist conception adopted later by anti-Semites⁷. Adopting a more positive perspective, Amédée or Augustin Thierry, for example, as well as Guizot, Quinet and Michelet, all used the concepts of race and nation interchangeably, borrowing the myth used by the nobility of a common descent (from the Frankish tribes). According to these writers, France included a diverse set of "peoples", of "nations". Jewish historians (like Léon Halévy in his *Résumé de l'histoire des Juifs* and Joseph Salvador in his *Institutions de Moïse*) used the idea of a peaceful coexistence between different "races" to assert a right to difference. France was made of a "holy alliance of peoples", each having specific features and each contributing something particular to French society. The Alliance Israélite Universelle (created in 1862) awarded a prize to Alfred Legoyt for his study on *La vitalité de la race juive en Europe* in 1865.

The main purpose of this "particularistic universalism" was to justify the notion that, despite their existing or perceived differences, the Jews were not only as French as other Frenchmen but were also "the same" in their different way – and a real asset to French society. Jewish publicists embraced the traditional stereotypes in order to fuel the concept of a "mission" for the Jewish race: In embracing d'Eichthal's claim that the Jews invented credit and commerce, for example, they offered the notion that this was a way in which they contributed to economic prosperity.

⁶ See Lisa Moses Leff, « Self-definition and Self-Defense : Jewish Racial Identity in Nineteenth Century France », *Jewish History*, 19, 2005, p.7-28

⁷ See Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, *Les racismes ordinaires*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1998.

Jewish leaders and publicists therefore adopted a racial (but not racist) form of self-identification while rejecting the complete assimilation strongly suggested by the National Assembly in 1791. According to them, furthermore, it was beneficial to France that they didn't abandon their particular beliefs.

Solidarity

This second strategy adopted also related to the idea that the revival of the Jewish community was essential for the protection of the Jews as individuals. The first step in this process was to obtain the institutionalization of Judaism. This goal was achieved with the creation of the '*Consistory System*' in 1808. The second step was to redefine the relationship between Judaism and the state. Jewish leaders used the concept of "solidarity" while trying to avoid the traditional accusations of communitarianism (the suspicion of being *solidaires*) to revitalize the Jewish community.

Like race, solidarity was a very popular concept among the Fourierist, socialist, republican and traditional catholic circles, with different meanings (and sometimes, anti-Semitic connotations). When redefined by Jewish leaders and writers, solidarity referred to civic virtues (such as philanthropy, brotherhood, charity) that defined Jewishness but had no separatist meaning. As Lisa Moses Leff wrote, "Jewish leaders saw their 'solidarity' as revealing their essential belonging to a French citizen body, defined as a community of individuals sharing a set of moral sentiments"⁸. Solidarity was thus an expression of both Jewish morality and French civic virtue.

Secondly, it was an appealing concept because it was a way to prove that the Jews, as Crémieux pointed out, could be useful -- not despite their differences but thanks to their specificities. Jewish networks, rooted in the concepts of chosenness ('divine election') and universal mission, would bring progress and peace. The final advantage of the notion of solidarity was the reference to international Jewish solidarity, characterized as included in and consistent with the French universal mission. The international Jewish community was not therefore exclusive; it was conceived as connective, creating bonds of moral obligation among all the people of the world. Imposed by the ambivalence of the French model of integration, this strategy failed to reconcile the contradictory notions of integrationism and separatism. It also failed to prevent a new upsurge of anti-Semitism that culminated with the Dreyfus Affair.

⁸ Op.cit, p.35

The debate about the relationship between integration and education encapsulated all these contradictions. Equality before the law for individuals constituted the first pillar of the French model of integration. The second pillar was the creation of a national system of education, later used by the Republicans to fabricate French citizens. Successive governments referred to the principles of utility and equal treatment. Jewish leaders responded by trying to use these same notions in attempting to reconcile the demands of integration with the desire to preserve French Jewish identity. One central question dominated the debate: should Jewish children attend general French public schools or separate Jewish ones?⁹

Shortly after its formation, the Central Jewish Consistory of France asked for permission to open Jewish schools. The argument was that separate schools would facilitate both integration and French national development by promoting a “Franco-Judaism” (P.Birbaum). Focusing on the concept of equal treatment under the law, French Jews argued that they should enjoy the same consideration showed by the government to French Catholics and Protestants – and thus claimed for budgetary support for Jewish schools. The official response was that the participation of Jewish children in the common educational system would be the most secure way to accelerate their integration. The state, however, did allow the existence of separate Jewish schools (under the supervision of the Ministry of Religion, and after 1831 the supervision of the Ministry of Education) - funded by the Jewish religious budget and not by the state. Furthermore, during the 1880’s, the government moved to limit the influence of the Catholic Church. It subsequently began to apply similar measures on Protestantism and Judaism while supporting the development of a rabbinical school. The Ecole centrale rabbinique de France thus received an annual allocation from the government.

This brief historical background contributes to our understanding of the recent convergence of interests and concerns between Jews and Muslims (despite the upsurge of the “new Judeophobia”). The “headscarves affair” and the debate about the new law on *laïcité* were the most obvious examples of this convergence. Furthermore, while Muslim organizations referred to the legal status of Jewish institutions in France in trying to obtain a broader recognition and protection with respect to secularity, the Jews increasingly drew on ethnic claims in expressing a sense of belonging to a “Jewish community”, mainly in the name of “solidarity” with the victims of recent anti-Semitic incidents.

⁹ See Jeffrey Haus, “Liberté, Egalité, Utilité: Jewish Education and State in Nineteenth Century France”, *Modern Judaism*, 22, 2002, p.1-27.

3. The sustainability of the republican model of integration

The ambivalence of assimilation, and disrespect for the notion of the “right to be the same” by French authorities, led to a voluntary process of communitarization. The persistence of anti-Semitism, however, created an involuntary communitarization. The inadequacy of the French model of integration was illustrated before WWII by the conflict over the specific duties of the Jewish community, and the necessity for the French Jews to prove their loyalty by underlying their specificities. These specificities, in turn, were used by anti-Semites.

Jewish integration entailed some tragic ironies. First, after WWII and the Holocaust (that is, after the deportation of French Jews by a French government), anti-Semitism remained the most effective incentive for the adoption of measures designed to protect them -- both as individuals and as members of a community.

First, the Matteoli Commission was appointed to assess the consequences of the anti-Semitic French legislation on Jewish property adopted by the Vichy regime. Then came the Draï Commission to compensate those who were eligible for restitution. Compensation enabled the creation of a Fund for the Remembrance of the Holocaust, chaired by Simone Veil, in December 2000. France started to pay its debts to the Jewish community more than two centuries after the “communal Jewish debt” issue.

It is true that “France is not an anti-Semitic country”, as repeatedly stated by French officials. Yes, to some extent, it is easier to be Jewish than Muslim. Yet it has constantly needed – and still needs – to strengthen its fight against anti-Semitism. The multiplication of anti-Semitic incidents forced the government to adopt new measures, such as the law of February 2002 (tougher penalties for racist, anti-Semitic or xenophobic offenses). The growth of a legal arsenal however raises one question: Is anti-Semitism a specific form of racism? Is anti-Semitism comparable to a general racism? Or, perhaps perversely, is anti-Semitism in France a form of anti-racism, as some leftist and Muslim proponents claim?

Other measures illustrate both the ability of the French government to react and the failure of the integration model. The government has taken the fight against anti-Semitism to schools (for instance, the 10 point program of action presented by Luc Ferry in February 2003). These republican schools that were supposed to form the social fabric of integration and are now considered to be “The Republic's Lost Territories” (Emmanuel Brenner).

A second tragic irony relates to the potential negative impact of these specific measures. Designed to balanced previous and recent prejudices, they also raised concerns among the Jewish community. According to M. Musicant, the Director General of the CRIF: “the nineties have strengthened the material and symbolic link between the Jews and their homeland. French President Jacques Chirac in his July 16, 1995, speech commemorating the roundup of the Jews in 1942 known as the "Vel d'Hiv roundup" officially condemned the responsibility of the Vichy regime in this tragic event of our history (...) May be the violence currently endured by the Jewish community is a backlash in one way or another of the efforts of compensation and of recognition of what happened during the Holocaust. The support in favor of the Jewish people is totally focused on the compensation for the Holocaust. Maybe those efforts have unwittingly unleashed a greater tolerance to the reactions to the Middle East conflict”.

Furthermore, referring to the media coverage of the so-called "conflict with the Arab-Muslim community", the CRIF recently noted in its 2004 report that: “Until now, the Jews in France were a model of integration into the Republic and were regarded as French citizens for generations and centuries. In the eye of the press, they suddenly became again "a community" with lots of question marks and suspicion at a time when France is asking itself how it will absorb its large Arab-Muslim community”. Paradoxically, perhaps, the CRIF devoted two third of this report to the praise of the new vitality of the Jewish “community”.

Members of the second and third generation of immigrants face challenges and dilemmas similar to those still faced by French Jews. As pointed out by Robert Wistrich, “Muslims and Arab immigrants in Europe have found themselves increasingly stereotyped and harassed (...) To a certain extent, they have replaced the Jews as the feared ‘other’ in a multicultural Europe”¹⁰. More specifically, in regards to the situation of Muslims, it is not difficult to reformulate the two main questions that formerly dominated the debate about Jewish emancipation: Are they to be considered as individuals of a different religion or instead members of a foreign nation living in France? Do the requirements of the Muslim religion allow its followers to fulfill the requirements of citizenship, or do the religious restrictions prevent them from full participation?

In fact, ethnic differentiation was never far from the republican discourse on integration and, therefore, on immigration. In the aftermath of WWII, the

¹⁰ Robert Wistrich, “The devil, the Jews, and hatred of the ‘Other’”, in: Robert S. Wistrich (ed.), *Demonizing the Other. Antisemitism, Racism and Xenophobia*, Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999, p.12.

French government was tempted to introduce ethnic categorization in policies designed to address the need for foreign labor recruitment and to compensate for the weak demographic growth. The Maghrebis were already considered the least able to be assimilated because of their cultural and religious differences. No ethnic quotas were specified in the 1945 ordinance but, in implementing these regulations, state agencies such as the ONI (Office national d'Immigration) tried to encourage immigration by Europeans rather than North Africans. In the 1960s and 1970s, governments were unable to find a middle path between conflicting objectives: to preserve the cultural and religious specificities in order to maintain repatriation as a policy option, and to facilitate integration through family reunification and the reform of the work-permit system. Furthermore, from 1974 (when France officially halted further immigration) to the 1980s, a series of actions strengthened communautarianism in France, independently -- or even against the will -- of immigrants. All this has led to ethnic (negative) discrimination.

State agencies in charge of housing, education and access to social rights based their activities on unofficial ethnic quotas in reflecting the ambivalence of the official doctrine. Numerous initiatives were implemented designed to maintain the distinctive cultural tradition (or at least, what was perceived as "distinctive" and "cultural") of minority groups. Public bodies, for example, facilitated the installation of Islamic places of worship in hostels, HLM blocks and state controlled companies such as Renault. Agreements were signed with the sending countries permitting the development of these places of worship outside the traditional religious locations, mainly in neighborhoods with high concentrations of Muslim immigrants. A 1976 decree allowed the French government to pay the salary of the imams while this « Islam in France » remained dependent on foreign assistance. It was not until the 1990s that the first training facilities for imams were created in France, and in 2003 the first Islamic school was established. French officials therefore began promoting the islamisation of Muslim immigrants (in order to keep open repatriation) but refused to exercise control over it. As a result, this islamisation of Maghrebi immigration turned into the ethnicization of Islam.

In the field of education, communautarianism took the form of the "classes d'initiation" (1973) for the teaching of "Homeland Languages and Cultures", which in fact reinforced the marginalization of the children and violated the secular and egalitarian principles governing the state education system. The HLM authorities were asked to limit the proportion of immigrants in designated social housing by spreading them across those urban areas. Concentrations of ethnic groups arose as a result, and ethnic differentiation turned into ethnic segregation and discrimination. The homes attributed to immigrants were concentrated in decaying parts of the public housing-stock and

local agencies applied quotas on a large scale (despite the 1972 law against discrimination). So, when the government decided to reorient its urban policy, the 'ghettoisation' was not just a pure fantasy exploited by the FN and the media.

French officials and state (or local) agencies promoted the ethnicization of immigration with these implicit references to ethnic difference. The result was the emergence of ethnicized groups (i.e. minority groups whose members are considered by the majority group to be separate from the national community). This ethnicization from "top to bottom" also induced the racialization of the Maghrebis perceived as a sub-group of ethnicized minorities and categorized by somatic features (*'délit de faciès'*). In other words, policies based on ethnicization preceded and contributed to the emergence of ethno-cultural groups whose members felt united by common origins and common values (mirror effect). Even if the children of immigrants identified themselves only weakly and partially with the cultural heritage of their parents, they were still considered as members of ethnicized minority groups. In turn, the recent structuration of these groups (bottom up strategy) consolidated their ethnicization by the majority group.

By the 1990s, it became obvious that minority groups were not only passively categorized by the majority group; they were also actively seeking for specific recognition and access to specific rights. Official and unofficial categorizations (through statistics, public perception, public policies) on the one hand together with social and spatial segregation from generation to generation on the other, generated an 'awareness of belonging' among ethnicized groups. This awareness found an ideological basis with the 'right of difference' proclaimed by the Socialist party in 1981 and received institutional backing through a series of measures promoted by successive governments (of both Left and Right) in order to manage pluralism.

The government made it easier for ethno-cultural groups to mobilize around different issues and projects by granting freedom of association to non-citizens (the 1901 law amended in 1981). Minority associations were also supported in this effort by the FAS (Fonds d'Action Sociale) -- the National Council of Immigrant Populations as well other state agencies. Reciprocal agreements between the state and immigrants created an 'ethnic market' (Kastoryano), where groups now compete for resources and public recognition. Mobilization took different forms with, for example, a distinction between mobilization *for* ethnicity and mobilization *through* ethnicity. As Hargreaves suggests, "some associations - those promoting language teaching or religious observance - draw on the bonds of ethnic affiliation to further cultural objectives. Others may be organized by and for members of ethnicized or ethno-

cultural groups, but not necessarily with the aim of strengthening ethnic identity” (p.98).

Another aspect of the ethnicization process is related to the context in which mobilization takes place: a conflictual situation generates specific actions (including the use of violence, especially in the ‘no-go’ zones) very different from those elaborated on the basis of negotiation with the co-option of immigrant representatives selected by the state and/or by members of the minority groups. Violence was used by a minority of youths (immigrants and French) in the recent urban riots, who (regardless of their ethnic origin) can envisage no possible future for themselves. Racism (but also school failure and unemployment) worsens social exclusion, feeding violence and thus reinforcing racism.

The objective of the young rioters was not to challenge the formal republican model of integration but to express resentment and distrust. To some extent, these violent youths involved want to be more integrated, not only in terms of formal rights but also in terms of social and economic inclusion. Unfortunately, the dominant idea that urban exclusion and urban violence are due to the “manipulations” of immigrants who are ‘reluctant to assimilate’ is based on an ethnic-cultural approach, a variant of the behavioral one, which pays little attention to income, housing allocation procedures and availability of suitable dwelling in certain areas. According to this dominant approach, housing conditions and residential patterns differ between groups and these differences can be attributed to their cultural differences.

In other words, a fundamental contradiction has undermined the official reaction: On the one hand, the French government reassessed the importance of the model of integration. On the other hand, the way the government highlighted the importance of this model has been based on an ethnic perception of urban issues. This led to the naturalization of violence (‘ethno-violence’), and to the social essentialisation (social/cultural differences are ethnically/racially grounded) of the rioters, commonly perceived as an « ethnic » category of ‘anti-socials’. Furthermore, the lack of civility is perceived as a lack of morality - the latter being defined not as a set of individual values but only as the collective acceptance of social norms imposed by the Republican model of integration – a model which was never clearly defined and not even respected by French officials.

Conclusion

Dominique de Villepin recently declared that: “what is in question is our republic and our model of integration which is founded on the equal recognition

of all our citizens”. He may have been but was not referring to anti-Semitic incidents. Rather he was talking about the urban riots in the “sensitive neighborhoods”.

To “go beyond the melting pot” supposes that, at least, you have access to it. A few years ago, Gérard Noiriel put the assimilationist French model on the agenda, arguing that that model has created a successful “*creuset français*”. Meanwhile, the “right to be different” was a simultaneously successful concept.

But, after a (short) while, it became obvious that the supporters of the differentialist strategy (‘France Plus’ for instance) called for more integration rather than using slogans emphasizing difference.¹¹

The majority of Jews are socially and economically well integrated. But it would be a mistake to pretend that the French model of integration in itself had secured their integration. In contrast, the majority of the members of the second and third generation of immigrants are not socially and economically well integrated. It would be hazardous to hope that the French model of integration in itself would allow their integration.

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¹¹ See Nancy L.Green, « Le melting pot : made in America, produced in France », *The Journal of American History*, vol 86, issue 3.

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Annex 1: the different forms of traditional anti-Semitism

	(Far) Right	(Far) Left
Anti-Judaism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - XIXth century : abbé Barruel, Joseph de Maistre, Bonald - Today : <i>Present</i>, Comités Chretienté-Solidarité, AGRIF (Alliance générale contre le racisme et pour le respect de l'identité française) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - XIXth century : Voltaire, Polier de Bottens
Economic and Social Anti-Semitism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - XIXth century : Drumont, Gustave Tridon, Auguste Chirac, Urbain Gohier - Today : Front National 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - XIXth century : Fourier, Toussenel, Pierre Leroux, Proudhon - Today : radical leftist movements (related to anticapitalism, tiers-mondisme, radical ecology)
Racial anti-Semitism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - XIXth century : Vacher de Lapouge, Gobineau - XXth century : Maurras, Daudet, Montherlant, Rebatet, Drieu la Rochelle (<i>Je suis partout</i>), Brasillach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - XIXth century : Jules Soury, Gustave Théry
Institutional anti-Semitism (the Vichy regime)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Xavier Vallat - Déat (former socialist) - Doriot (former communist) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Syndicats</i> (ex-CGT) - Charles Spinasse (<i>Rouge et Bleu</i>)
Anti-Zionism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Jeune Europe, Front Européen de libération - Front National 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Garaudy (abbé Pierre), <i>L'Idiot international</i>, Jean Brière (former ecologist)
Revisionism (denial of the Holocaust)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bardèche - François Duprat - B. Notin - Front national 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pierre Guillaume, Paul Rassinier, Serge Thion, Faurisson